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We consider resource allocation within an organisation and show how delegation bears on 
moral hazard and adverse selection when agents have a preference for autonomy. Agents may 
care about autonomy for reasons of job-satisfaction, status or greater reputation when 
performing well under autonomy. Separating allocations (overall budget and degree of 
delegation) are characterised depending on the preference for autonomy. As the latter 
increases, the degree of delegation assigned to productive and unproductive agents converges. 
If agents’ preferences for monetary rewards are weak, the principal will not employ financial 
transfers. Pooling then arises under a strong preference for autonomy.  
Keywords: adverse selection, capital budgeting, delegation, intrinsic motivation, moral 
hazard. 
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1 Introduction 
When devising resource (or budget) allocations, principals regularly face a trade-off between 
delegating to an agent tasks, for which he has a comparative advantage, and retaining 
sufficient control of the agent’s actions. This control is warranted to contain the potential 
problems of adverse selection – the agent over-stating the value of the project or his own 
productivity in order to attract additional budget – and moral hazard – the agent providing 
insufficient effort in using the budget, leading to under-achievement. In a perfect world, the 
principal could address these agency problems either by retaining full control; or by 
delegating as fully as possible while at the same time exposing the agent to the strongest 
possible incentives, e.g. by selling the firm. In reality, monitoring costs on the one hand and 
wealth constraints or risk aversion on the other render these solutions impractical. Usually the 
principal will have to strike a balance between delegating and retaining control. Harris and 
Raviv (1998) explain delegation of budgeting decisions as a response to costly auditing. The 
cost of communication, the incompleteness of agency contracts and the ‘value of flexibility’ 
also tend to favour delegation (Melumad et al. 1997). Holmstrom and Roberts (1994) 
demonstrate that delegation - in the sense of transferring assets to the agent and/or of relaxing 
controls on the returns of assets accruing to the agent - paired with strong outcome related 
incentives, is an optimal response to a lower cost of outcome measurement or a lower risk. In 
contrast, more control is favoured if spill-overs between agents require central co-ordination 
or if agents hold lower bargaining power than the principal vis-à-vis third parties (Caillaud et 
al. 1996). 
One common aspect of these models is that agents are concerned about central control only 
insofar as it limits their scope to manipulate information or engage in slacking. In this regard, 
the models are firmly rooted in the neo-classical paradigm in which agents are motivated by 
extrinsic incentives, i.e. by performance-related rewards or punishments. A more recent line 
of literature acknowledges that agents may be motivated by non-financial-aspects of their 
jobs. Frey (1993, 1997) argues that agents are driven by intrinsic motivation. This means that 
agents derive satisfaction from performing a task well and provide effort even in the absence 
of extrinsic incentives. However, intrinsic motivation is not independent of the working 
environment. Specifically, it may be crowded out by extrinsic incentives such as performance 
standards and the associated punishments or rewards.
1 The latter tend to destroy the agents’ 
                                                        
1 Hence, agents not only care about outcomes but also about the process at which these outcomes are arrived at 
(Sen 1997). Frey and Benz (2002) argue that procedural utility derived from the mode of production (self-  2 
self-evaluation of doing ‘something decent’ over and above what is expected or even enforced 
anyway. The control associated with extrinsic rewards also leads to a loss of self-
determinedness that further undermines motivation. The possible crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivation constrains the principal’s scope in providing external performance incentives.
2 
Even in the absence of intrinsic motivation, agents may have a preference for autonomy. This 
is the case if the agent’s performance and the degree of control are – at least to some extent – 
observable. In this case, a good performance under a greater degree of autonomy is clearly a 
better signal of an agent’s ability than the same performance achieved under tight 
supervision.
3 Thus, the reputation and, with it, the prospective earnings of an agent tend to 
increase in the degree of autonomy. 
Applying these ideas to budgeting one should expect the optimal mix of delegation and 
control to be determined not only by technological and informational considerations but also 
by its impact on motivation. Ignoring the latter could lead to distortions in the agent’s effort 
and/or revelation of private information, outweighing the benefits from greater control. More 
positively, the principal can use autonomy as an incentive device. The present analysis 
addresses the implications for the allocation of budgets of an agent’s preference for autonomy 
under moral hazard and adverse selection. We consider a model in which a principal allocates 
to an agent a budget for the purpose of production and determines the agent’s autonomy in the 
use of it. She may also use a financial transfer to motivate the agent. The agent’s utility 
increases both in the transfer and in an intrinsic benefit (job satisfaction), the latter depending 
on the degree of autonomy. Agents differ in their efficiency in using a delegated budget either 
because they differ in ability or they face projects of varying profitability. Here, we assume 
that an agent’s type may be unknown to the principal. The agent’s preferences over autonomy 
determine his effort but also his choice between different budgetary allocations. Thus, the 
                                                                                                                                                                             
employed or not) matters and provide evidence supporting the view that job satisfaction decreases in the degree 
of control.  
2 Barkema (1995) provides evidence for this by showing that the effect of external intervention on work 
performance in Dutch firms is significantly positive (negative) in the case of impersonal (personal) control. 
Since intrinsic motivation tends to be more sensitive in personal relationships, the evidence lends some support 
to the crowding out hypothesis. Roomkin and Weisbrod (1999) provide evidence that managerial incentives are 
significantly weaker in non-profit as opposed to for-profit hospitals. This may be due to a number of 
explanations. First, it may reflect the consumption of rents as slack within non-profit organisations. Second, it 
may reflect that non-profit hospitals perform additional tasks related to equity objectives or the provision of 
public goods. In as far as these tasks are difficult to monitor, the multi-task nature of the problem may require 
weak incentives on all tasks. Finally, the absence of strong incentives is consistent with the presence of 
intrinsically motivated staff. This is particularly likely when intrinsically motivated managers self-select into 
non-profit organisations.  
3 There is an extensive literature on the incentive effects of career concerns (e.g., Holmstrom 1999, Dewatripont 
et al. 1999), but to my knowledge it does not address the signal’s dependence on the degree of autonomy.   3 
level of autonomy granted to an agent is determined technologically by the agent’s efficiency 
in handling the budget, motivationally by the agent’s propensity to provide effort in return to 
autonomy, and by the agent’s self-selection incentives.  
If agents value autonomy, the principal uses delegation as a stimulus for the provision of 
effort. Under full information about an agent’s productivity but not about effort an efficient 
type receives both the greater budget and the greater degree of autonomy. Under asymmetric 
information, the principal distorts the overall budgets and the degree of delegation from their 
efficient levels in order to guarantee self-selection. In this, the agent’s preference for 
autonomy turns out to play an important role. Unexpected allocations arise in the presence of 
a strong preference for autonomy. If the preference for autonomy is sufficiently strong but not 
too strong, the inefficient agent receives the greater budget and the degree of delegation is 
distorted downwards for the efficient agent and upwards for the inefficient agent. If the 
preference for autonomy is very strong the budget allocation depends on whether the principal 
employs a financial transfer as an additional instrument to generate self-selection. If the agent 
values job satisfaction sufficiently more than the monetary benefit, the principal abstains from 
the use of financial incentives. Budgets are then pooled if the preference for autonomy is 
strong. Otherwise, in a separating equilibrium a transfer is paid to the inefficient type, who 
receives the lower budget but, perversely, a greater degree of delegation. Our findings 
illustrate the potentially important role of preferences for autonomy – or preferences over the 
mode of production more generally – for intra-organisational resource allocation. This role 
becomes particularly pertinent when the agent’s preferences differ significantly from the 
principal’s. 
We can think of at least three environments in which intrinsic motivation is important and 
leads to a potential for conflict over autonomy between the principal and agent. Intrinsic 
motivation and a concern for autonomy are likely to matter to agents performing creative 
tasks such as R&D, the drawing up of advertising campaigns or strategic planning in general 
business environments, but also the development of projects in the artistic or entertainment 
sector. In these sectors agents are usually directly motivated by the quality of their output 
rather than by financial incentives alone. Another area of application for our model is an 
environment in which the agent enters a (possibly long-term) relationship with a client and is 
concerned about providing a good service to this client. This includes many of the professions 
such as physicians, teachers, lawyers and consultants. The third environment is one of a 
public or non-profit organisation, where a public service spirit is the source of incentives.   4 
A recent literature deals with the effects on agency relationships of intrinsic motivation or, 
similarly, a public service spirit. Francois (2000) compares the incentives within public or 
non-profit as opposed to private providers when agents care in an altruistic way about the 
service provided.
4 Delfgaauw and Dur (2002) derive optimal incentive contracts for 
intrinsically motivated workers and consider the selection of workers into the firm when 
motivation is unobservable but may be signalled.
5 While asymmetric information about agent 
type pertains in our model as well, we consider screening rather than signalling. Glazer (2004) 
analyses how the principal chooses an input jointly with an intrinsically motivated agent’s 
choice of effort. In all of these models agents care about output but in contrast to our model 
their motivation does not depend on the mode of production. 
Besley and Ghatak (2003) also model public service motivation but take into account that the 
organisation’s mission influences incentives, where a mission is defined as the attributes of a 
project that make people value its success over and above the monetary reward. Their analysis 
focuses on principal-agent matching rather than on optimal incentive schemes. Aghion and 
Tirole (1997) show that it pays principals to grant ‘real’ authority, even at the expense of 
control, if this induces agents to exert additional effort and relaxes their participation 
constraint.
6 Their analysis then focuses on how organisational overload or institutional 
arrangements commit principals to transfer real authority to agents even when retaining 
formal authority. Murdock (2002) analyses how agents can be motivated by allowing them to 
establish a loss-making project with high intrinsic value in exchange for their effort towards a 
profit-making project. Due to the principal’s lack of commitment these contracts will usually 
have to be relational rather than explicit. While these models share with ours the idea that the 
principal can enhance (intrinsic) motivation by giving up some control to the agent, they focus 
on the moral hazard problem alone and do not consider adverse selection, the key issue of our 
analysis. 
Bénabou and Tirole (2003: section 3.1) consider the scope for crowding in intrinsic 
motivation by way of granting autonomy to an agent. They assume that the agent rather than 
the principal is imperfectly informed about his ability. By granting autonomy the principal 
                                                        
4 See also Dixit (2002). Heckman et al. (1996) provide empirical evidence supporting the presence of a public 
service spirit. They find that US social workers systematically select the least employable cases into job training 
programme in spite of performance incentives encouraging cream-skimming in favour of the most employable. 
5 Within different set-ups, Bénabou and Tirole (2003) and Grepperud and Pedersen (2004) derive optimal 
performance pay when intrinsic motivation may be crowded out.  
6 A similar spirit underlies the models by Gertner et al. (1994) and Mitusch (2000), where the agent’s effort 
decreases in the degree of control as this delimits a real resource (rather than an intrinsic) rent.    5 
signals that the agent’s ability is high. By raising the agent’s confidence this raises the 
willingness to provide effort. Similar to our model, asymmetric information about the agent’s 
type bears on the degree of delegation, but in a different way, as Bénabou and Tirole assume 
the principal rather than the agent to be informed.  
Our model is also related to the principal-agent literature as applied to budgeting problems 
and is closest in spirit to Harris and Raviv (1998) and Bernardo et al. (2001).
7 Harris and 
Raviv (1998) consider an adverse selection setting without moral hazard in which the 
principal can use a costly audit as an instrument besides a budget assignment. They show that 
the optimal capital allocation generally implies over- (under-) investment for projects with 
low (high) productivity. The extent of this distortion increases in the audit cost. Harris and 
Raviv explain the scope for delegation – in the sense of the manager having a choice over 
capital allocations across two projects that cannot be predicted by the principal – as an 
increasing function of the auditing cost. The focus of our analysis lies not so much with an 
explanation of delegation, the necessity of which we take for granted, but rather with the 
incentive role of delegation with regard to moral hazard and adverse selection. Similar to us, 
Bernardo et al. (2001) consider both moral hazard and adverse selection, where in both cases 
agents have an incentive to over-report profitability or level of ability in order to attract high 
budgets. As agents are not directly concerned about output in Bernardo et al., they can only be 
motivated by performance pay. While we also consider the scope for performance pay, one 
key instrument to stimulate effort is the budget allocation, as modified by the degree of 
autonomy.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 
derives the full information optimum and discusses the role of delegation in resolving moral 
hazard when output is non-contractible. In section 4, we analyse in detail the allocation under 
adverse selection maintaining the assumption of non-contractible output. Section 5 extends 
the findings to the case where financial transfers are used (section 5.1) and to the case of 
contractible output (section 5.2). Section 6 concludes. The proofs are relegated to an 
appendix. 
2 The  model 
                                                        
7 For a more detailed review of this literature see Harris and Raviv (1998).   6 
An agent produces an output or service, the value of which is given by a homogeneous 
function  () ( ) β β , , , , , r b ef r b e h = , where e is a non-contractible effort, b  is the delegated 
budget and r  is the budget, over which the principal retains control. The productivity of the 
budgetary input b  is measured by β . In order to simplify the analysis, we adopt a Cobb-
Douglas specification 
()
ρ β β r b r b f = , ,,   () 1 , 0 ∈ β ;  () 1 , 0 ∈ ρ   () 1 2 < + ρ β ;
8 
Thus, each budget exhibits non-negative but decreasing returns. A few words are warranted as 
to our interpretation of the delegated and controlled budgets. Suppose the principal assigns an 
overall budget  r b B + =  to the agent. The delegated budget b  is the part of the overall 
allocation over the use of which the agent can dispose freely in the course of production. The 
controlled budget r  may be spent by the principal on the purchase of inputs, which are then 
transferred to the agent for further use. Alternatively, the agent may have to obtain the 
principal’s approval on the use of r , or only use this budget according to strict guidelines. 
Let us now introduce the concept of delegation and autonomy we have in mind. Define 
r
b D = :,   [ ) ∞ ∈ , 0 D  as the ‘degree of delegation’. It appeals to us to use the degree of 
delegation as a proxy measure of autonomy, understood as the absence of central 
intervention.
9 Using  r
b D =  together with  r b B + =  to rewrite  D
B r + = 1  and  D
DB b + = 1 , we obtain 
the relationship  () () ()
ρ β β β β
+





BD D f D B F 1 1 1 , , , ,  describing production as a function 
of the degree of delegation and the overall budget. Subsequently, we will make use of both 
specifications,  () ⋅ , ,r b f  and  () ⋅ , ,D B F  according to analytical and presentational convenience. 
The model remains general about the particular use in production of the budgetary inputs b  
and r . Likewise we side-step the issue, as to which activities should be delegated in order to 
focus on the incentive role of delegation. In this regard, the function  () ⋅ F  is a ‘black-box’, 
reflecting that production can be organised in a variety of ways, involving a greater or lesser 
extent of delegation. The production elasticity  β  captures the efficiency of delegation. It 
depends on the agent’s technology and information as well as on the transaction costs 
                                                        
8 The last constraint on the parameters guarantees concavity of the objective function. 
9 We define the degree of delegation as a factor-intensity for analytical convenience. A more intuitive measure of 
the degree of delegation would be the share of the delegated budget in the total budget  r b
b
+ . It is easy to verify 
that for any two pairs () r b, a n d  () ' , ' r b  it is true that  ' '
'
' '







b = > = ⇔ > + + . Thus, a greater degree of 
delegation implies and is implied by a greater share of the delegated budget in the total budget.   7 
involved in delegation.
 For example, β  may be low if the agent uses an inferior technology, if 
he operates under poorer information, if he wields little bargaining power vis-à-vis local 
suppliers, or if he is simply less effective in managing a budget. Alternatively,  β  may 
characterise the specific project to be carried out by the agent, where projects with a high β  
allow greater gains to delegation perhaps because they are of a non-standard nature so that 
there is little experience at the centre. The elasticity  ρ  captures the effectiveness of 
controlling budgets. It is determined by the cost of communication between the principal and 
agent and the cost of ensuring the agents’ compliance.
10 It is readily verified that  () ⋅ F  is 
maximised at  ρ
β = D
~
 for any budget B . Indeed, if agents are unconcerned about autonomy, 
D
~
 is the optimal degree of delegation. In the following, we will occasionally refer to it as the 
‘technologically’ efficient degree of delegation.
11  
The agent receives utility  at u v + = , where u  is the agent’s non-monetary benefit of 
production and at  is the value the agent places on a monetary transfer received from the 
principal, e.g. a salary. The agent’s non-monetary benefit of production is given by 
() ( ) r
b e D r b e h D w u = − = : ; , , , 2
2
β α  (1) 
It increases in output  () ⋅ h and decreases in the quadratic cost of effort. The extent to which an 
agent benefits from his production is governed by the weight  () D w , embracing the agent’s 
preferences over autonomy and control. Specifically, let  
()
α α kD D w = ,,   [] ρ α , 0 ∈ ,   0 > k , 
where the parameter α  reflects the agent’s preference for autonomy.
12 A greater degree of 
delegation, i.e. greater autonomy, raises the utility weight if and only if  0 > α . The agent’s 
concern about production could be explained by any of the following reasons. First, 
                                                        
10 In this regard, we distinguish the actions that can be controlled for by the principal from those for which the 
unverifiable effort e is relevant. The former could relate to spending decisions, whereas the latter would relate 
to the effort taken by the agent in drawing up the project and generating options that enhance its value. 
11  D
~
 can be understood as the outcome of a more complete model of  () ⋅ F . For instance,  () β , ,D B F  captures in 
a nutshell the model by Harris and Raviv (1998) which explains delegation D  (although defined differently) and 
the level of an overall budget  B  as a function of auditing cost  ρ . When agents use budgets for purchasing, 
there may be a trade-off between the centre’s greater bargaining power and the agents’ superior information 
about producers (Caillaud et al. 1996). If the production set is convex with respect to this trade-off, again this 
implies an optimal degree of delegation. 
12 k  is a scaling parameter.   8 
intrinsically motivated agents care about  () ⋅ h , with the motivation increasing in the degree of 
autonomy. Second, agents may derive a ‘warm glow’ benefit à la Andreoni (1990) from 
providing to their customers a service  () ⋅ h , a benefit they derive only to the extent of their 
‘personal’ contribution towards it. Third, agents may be driven by professional status (e.g. 
Encinosa et al. 1997). As status usually rises with the degree of responsibility, it is plausible 
to assume that the agent’s benefit from status increases not only with output but also with the 
extent to which this has been produced autonomously. Finally,  () () ⋅ ⋅ h w  may be a measure of 
the agent’s (discounted) future earnings, as determined by the reputation from having carried 
out the present task. It is reasonable to assume that the value of the reputation increases not 
only in the outcome but also in the degree of autonomy, as this measures the agent’s 
individual as opposed to the organisation’s contribution towards production.
13  
In the following, we assume that there are two types of agents/projects, efficient (E) and 
inefficient (I), where efficient agents/projects are characterised by  I E β β > . Let  [] 1 , 0 ∈ λ  
denote the probability of an agent/project being an E type, or alternatively the share of E types 
in the population. We assume that the budgets are levied at a constant unit cost of φ . A risk-
neutral principal then maximises the expected net value of production 
() () ( ) []






+ + − − +
+ + −
=
I I I I I I I
E E E E E E E
I I I E E E t r b r b e h
t r b r b e h




, , , 1
, , ,
, , , , ,    (2). 
With regard to timing, we follow the standard contracting framework under adverse selection 
as summarised in figure 1.  
 
time 
P offers contract 
{}I E i t r b i i i , , , =  
A decides on whether to 
participate and if yes self-
selects contract. 
P assigns budgets {} i i i t r b , , 
A chooses effort  i e .  
A privately observes 
type  {} I E β β β , ∈  
Output  i h  and transfer  i t  are 
realised 
 
Figure 1: Timing of contract. 
                                                        
13 In some instances agents may dislike responsibility and prefer central control. An analysis for the case  0 < α  
can be found in Kuhn (2004).   9 
The agent privately observes his type  {} E I β β β , ∈ . Then, the principal offers a contract 
{} i i i t r b , , , which the agent accepts or rejects. Upon acceptance the agent self-selects. The 
contract is then executed with the principal providing the budgets and the agent choosing 
effort. Finally, output is realised and transfers take place. We derive our main result for a 
setting in which neither effort, e, nor output, h, are contractible. We have in mind a situation 
in which the agent does not produce a marketable output but rather an intermediate input into 
a more general production function. This embraces activities such as R&D, advertising, 
designing or strategic planning, the contributions of which towards a company’s profit are 
difficult to verify. Output verification is also difficult in case of a bureaucrat producing a non-
market good or service. In this case, the transfer  i t  from the principal to the agent cannot be 
made contingent on output but only on the budgetary allocation {} i i r b , . Note that the 
aforementioned activities often feature a strong role for motivation and autonomy. In order to 
gauge the robustness of our results, we present in section 5.2 some results for the case of 
contractible output.  
We assume that the agent faces a wealth constraint  0 t t ≥  and that the outside benefit  0 v  is 
sufficiently low such that participation at  0 t t ≥  is guaranteed. A slack participation constraint 
is not unlikely when the agent’s non-monetary benefit is substantial but cannot be extracted 
due to a wealth constraint. We could think of at least two reasons for why the intrinsic benefit 
may outweigh the outside benefit such that  0 v u ≥ . First, many of the professional, ‘creative’, 
charitable or public services relying on intrinsic motivation also involve quasi-rents due to the 
accumulation of specific knowledge or due to long-term provider-client relationships. 
Researchers or advertising designers working for a specific company acquire company 
specific knowledge that enhances both productivity and the intrinsic benefit from working for 
this particular company or on this particular project. The same applies to sales personnel or 
professionals such as physicians, lawyers or consultants who have accumulated intimate 
knowledge on their clients. Furthermore, it is plausible that a provider’s intrinsic benefit from 
servicing a client increases in the duration of the relationship as stronger personal ties 
develop. All of this suggests that the agent’s non-monetary benefit from performing this 
particular activity may well lie above his outside utility. Second, the agent may face a 
principal who monopolises resources that are crucial for the realisation of a project with 
intrinsic value to the agent. For example, the agent may be a researcher who has to rely on a 
highly specific research lab/technology that is monopolised by a single institution. Another   10 
example would be the realisation of a project by an artist or a movie/theatre director that 
requires funding or distribution channels provided only by a monopolistic large-scale 
producer. The intrinsic value of the project to the agent (when carried out) is then likely to 
exceed the outside utility (of not carrying out the project). In all of the above cases, rent 
equalisation would require a possibly substantive payment from the agent to the principal. 
Under our assumption that such payments are ruled out by wealth constraints, the agent’s 
non-monetary rents cannot be (fully) extracted. The agent’s ex-post utility then satisfies 
0 ≥ + = at u v , where the agent could always choose a non-verifiable effort  0 = e . Without 
further loss of generality, we normalise  0 0 = v  and  0 0 = t  so that participation is guaranteed 
irrespective of the agent’s type.
14 
3  Allocation when output is not contractible: Motivation by delegation  
For the moment we assume that the agent’s productivity β  is observable. When neither effort 
nor output are contractible the principal cannot use the transfers to stimulate effort on the part 
of the agent. In this case, it is optimal to set  0 = = I E t t , where the wealth constraint binds. As 
the principal can identify the type of individual agents/projects, she allocates type specific 
budgets so as to  0 , , ,
max = = I E
I I E E
t t r b r b
π  as given in (2). In so doing, she will take into account the 
effect of delegation on the agent’s motivation and provision of effort. Solving the problem 
backwards, we begin by considering the agent’s choice of effort. Given the budget, the agent 
chooses effort so as to maximise utility (1). From the first-order condition  
() ( ) ()
α ρ α β β β
− + = = = r kb r b f D w r b e e , , , , ˆ
*    (3), 
we obtain output and utility as reduced form functions of the budgets  
() () () ( ) ()
α ρ α β β β β β
− + = = =
2 2 2 , , , , , , ˆ , , ˆ r kb r b f D w r b f r b e r b h    (4), 
() () ( ) () () [] ()( ) [] () () α ρ α β β β β β β







1 , , , , ˆ , , , , ˆ , , ˆ r b k r b f D w r b e r b f D w r b e r b u    (5). 
                                                        
14 Generally, the interaction of the wealth and participation constraints defines a range of different regimes 
similar to those featured in Laffont and Martimort (2002: section 3.5). With the main interest of the present 
analysis on the regime with a slack participation constraint, we do not provide a complete characterisation.   11 
Placing the restriction  1 ≥ b  we obtain  () 0 , , ˆ > β β r b h  and  () 0 , , ˆ > β β r b u  as well as 
() 0 , , ˆ > β β r b hx  and  () 0 , , ˆ > β β r b ux ,  r b x , = .
15 Hence, total and marginal output as well as 
total and marginal utility are greater for the E type, reflecting greater productivity. Again, for 
convenience we will sometimes express effort, output and utility as functions 












BD u D B U + + = . One 
can easily check that equilibrium effort and utility are concave in  D, with 
() [] D D
U
D
E α ρ β α − − + = = ∂
∂
∂
∂ sgn sgn sgn
ˆ ˆ . The principal can then stimulate extra effort by 
increasing the degree of delegation up to the level  
()I E i D B U D i i i
i






    (6)   
that maximises the agent’s utility. The concavity of  () β , , ˆ D B E  in D reflects the conventional 
wisdom that granting some responsibility tends to make people work harder, while too much 
delegation encourages slack. 
Consider now the principal’s choice of budgets. The optimum in the presence of moral hazard 
(with non-contractible output) { }
* * * * , , , I I E E r b r b  can be characterised as follows.  
Proposition 1. (i) The efficient agent receives both a greater delegated and a greater 
controlled budget, i.e. 
* *
I E b b >  and 
* *
I E r r > . (ii) Moral hazard leads to an upward 
distortion for both types in the degree of delegation over and above the technologically 
efficient level  i D
~  if and only if agents have a preference for autonomy, i.e. if and only if 
0 > α . (iii) The principal delegates to greater extent to the efficient agent, i.e. 
* *
I E D D > . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
The optimal degree of delegation under moral hazard is given by  
()










   (7). 
                                                        
15 As is readily checked from the first-order conditions for the optimal choice of budgets as described in the 
Appendix to Proposition1,  1 ≥ b  is satisfied if φ  is sufficiently small.    12 
It is readily checked that  i i i D D D
~ ˆ 0
* > > ⇔ > α . If and only if the agent prefers a degree of 
delegation  i D ˆ  over and above the technologically efficient level  i D
~
, the principal can 
stimulate additional effort by over-delegating. 
As the agent’s utility increases both in b  and r , we have  ( ) ( ) i I I i E E r b u r b u β β , , ˆ , , ˆ
* * * * >  and 
both types prefer the budget allocated to the E type. Inefficient agents then have an incentive 
to misrepresent their type, thereby causing a problem of adverse selection.  
4  Allocation when productivity is unobservable: Screening by delegation 
From now on, we consider the level of efficiency β  to be the agent’s private information, the 
principal only being informed about the distribution of types. Expressing for expositional 
convenience the analysis in terms of the degree of delegation  i D  and total budget  i B , we can 
write the principal’s problem as  
() ( ) [ ] () ( ) ( ) [ ] I I I I I E E E E E I E i t R B
t B D B H t B D B H
i i i
+ − − + + − =
=
φ β λ φ β λ π , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ max
, ; , ,
 
subject to the self-selection constraints 
()( ) E I E E I I I I at D B U at D B U + ≥ + β β , , ˆ , , ˆ    (ICI), 
() ( ) I E I I E E E E at D B U at D B U + ≥ + β β , , ˆ , , ˆ , (ICE), 
and the wealth constraints  0 ≥ E t  and  0 ≥ I t . (ICI) and (ICE) imply the monotonicity 
condition  
() () 0 , ˆ , ˆ ≥ ∆ ⋅ + ∆ ⋅ D U B U I D I B β β β β    (M), 




* * * * * * * * * * * * , , , , , I I I E E E t D B t D B  denote the optimal allocation. For the moment, suppose 
that the principal does not use financial transfers, such that  0
* * * * = = I E t t . We will 
characterise in Lemma 5 at the end of this section the precise circumstances under which this 
                                                        
16 The appropriate derivatives of  () β , , ˆ D B U are easily determined from (5) when setting  D
DB b + = 1  and  D
B r + = 1 .   13 
is the case. Intuitively, the principal abstains from transfers whenever the agent has a weak 
preference for monetary rewards as opposed to job-satisfaction. In this case motivation by 
way of financial transfers becomes too expensive for the principal and she abstains. 
The following Lemma narrows down the monotonicity condition for the case in which 
transfers are not used. 
Lemma 1. For  0
* * * * = = I E t t , it must be true that  0 ≥ ∆D .  
Proof: See Appendix. 
Thus, as expected, it is unfeasible in the absence of transfer payments to reverse the degree of 
delegation. We can now characterise as follows the degree of delegation assigned to each type 
in a separating equilibrium. Define  
() ( ) 0 , , ˆ 1 :




= I i i B i
I
i D B U D β
ρ β
α ρ
µ κ ;  I E j i , , = , 
where  1 µ  is the shadow price of the (ICI) constraint. Here,  0 1 > µ  is shown as part of Lemma 
A1 in the Appendix. The following holds. 
Lemma 2. The optimal levels of delegation 
* *
I D  and 
* *











* * * * * * ; ˆ
1
min E I I
I
I I D D D D D
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* * * * * * ; ˆ max I I E
E
E E D D D D D
φλ
κ
   (8b). 
Proof: See Appendix.  
Generally, the optimal degree of delegation in the presence of adverse selection, 
* *
i D , 
deviates from the level, 
*
i D , that would be realised in the presence of moral hazard alone. 
According to (8a), incentive compatibility for the I type requires an increase (decrease) in the 
I type’s degree of delegation if this type prefers a degree of delegation,  I D ˆ , that exceeds (falls 
short of) 
*
I D . Likewise, we see from (8b) that (ICI) requires an increase (decrease) in the E   14 
type’s degree of delegation if  I D ˆ  falls short of (exceeds) the degree of delegation 
*
E D  that is 
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1 : w i t h  
P B  and 
P D  denoting the pooling levels of the budget and degree of 
delegation, respectively. Note that  () ρ α α , ˆ ∈ . We can now distinguish three regimes. 
Lemma 3. (i)  [ )
* * * * * * , 0 E E I I D D D D < < ≤ ⇔ ∈ α α ; (ii) 
[ )
* * * * * * ˆ , E E I I D D D D ≤ < < ⇔ ∈ α α α ; (iii) 
P
I E D D D = = ⇔ ≥
* * * * ˆ α α . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
We thus know how the degree of delegation for each type evolves with the preference for 
autonomy, α . Before we discuss the separating and the pooling allocation more fully let us 
establish how the total budgets 
* *
E B  and 
* *
I B  depend on α .  
Lemma 4. (i)  [ )
* * * * * * ; , 0 E E I I B B B B > > ⇒ ∈ α α , where 
* *
E I B B <  if and only if α  sufficiently 
small; (ii)  [ ) { } { }
* * * * * * , min , max ˆ , E I E I B B B B < ⇒ ∈ α α α ; (iii) 
* * * * * * ˆ E E
P
I I B B B B B < = = < ⇔ ≥α α . 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Under adverse selection, the principal always pays a budget to the efficient (inefficient) type 
that falls short (exceeds) the optimal budget, under moral hazard alone. Self-selection requires 
that a rent is paid to the informed agent, in our case the I type. Where agents care far less 
about financial transfers than about their job satisfaction, the principal does not use a transfer 
but rather pays the rent in form of an excess budget  0
* * * > − I I B B . Rental payments in form of 
excessive budgets are associated with an efficiency loss, as the marginal product of 
* *
I B  falls 
short of the marginal cost of funds. By reducing the E type’s budget from its level 
*
E B  the 
principal lowers the attractiveness of mimicking this type and is, thus, able to reduce the 
excess budget paid to the I type and the associated inefficiency. This resembles the finding by   15 
Harris and Raviv (1998) where, in the presence of an imperfect monitoring technology, the 
principal reacts to a situation of asymmetric information by reducing the gap in the budgets 
aimed at the efficient and inefficient type. Bearing this in mind, we can now proceed with a 
fuller characterisation of the allocation under asymmetric information. The findings in 
Lemmas 3 and 4 can be combined as follows.  
Proposition 2. (a) If agents have a weak preference for autonomy ( [ ) α α , 0 ∈ ), the principal 
delegates to both types more than she would in the absence of adverse selection. She pays a 
greater total budget to the inefficient type (as compared to the efficient type) if and only if the 
degree of delegation is sufficiently high. (b) If agents have a strong preference for autonomy 
( [ ) α α α ˆ , ∈ ), the principal delegates less (more) to the efficient (inefficient) type than she 
would in the absence of adverse selection. She pays a greater total budget to the inefficient 
type. (c) If agents have a very strong preference for autonomy ( [] ρ α α , ˆ ∈ ), the principal 
pools the degree of delegation and the budgets. 
According to the agent’s preference for autonomy, we can distinguish three regimes. Regimes 
(a) and (b) involve separation; regime (c) involves pooling. When screening the agents, the 
principal uses the degree of delegation in addition to the budget. This is best illustrated with 
reference to the benchmark case in which agents do not have preferences about the mode of 
production, i.e., about the degree of autonomy. In this case,  0 = α  which from (8a) and (8b) 
implies  I E E D D D ˆ * * * > >  and  I I I D D D ˆ * * * = = . Since the agent prefers the same degree of 
delegation as the principal, any deviation from the optimal level leads to a reduction in job 
satisfaction. Recall that the information rent paid to the I type (in terms of an excess budget 
0
* * * > − I I B B ) is set so as to equalise the job satisfaction the I type receives on his own and on 
the E type’s contract. But then any deviation from the optimal degree of delegation  I I D D ˆ * =  
must lead to a decrease in satisfaction on the ‘own’ job calling for an increase in the 
budget/rent. The principal thus refrains from a distortion. In contrast, an increase in the E 
type’s degree of delegation renders this allocation less attractive for the I type and, thereby, 
helps to contain the information rent and the associated distortions in the budgets.  
If  0 > α  the principal and agent no longer agree on a preferred degree of delegation. 
Specifically, the agent prefers a greater degree than the principal, 
* ˆ
i i D D > . There is now 
scope for the principal to reduce the information rent (in terms of excess budget) by granting 
the I type a more preferred degree of delegation. As long as the preference α  is sufficiently   16 
low relative to the productivity spread  I E β β −  [regime (a)], the I type’s preferred degree of 
delegation falls short of the one the principal would assign to the E type, i.e. 
* ˆ
E I D D < . The 
principal can then enhance the I type’s satisfaction on the own job by setting the degree of 
delegation in the interval  ( ] I I I D D D ˆ ,
* * * ∈ , and reduce the I type’s satisfaction on the E type’s 
job by setting 
* * *
E E D D > . This allows the principal to contain the rent and the associated 
distortions in the budget levels. Indeed, as long as α  is sufficiently close to zero, the E type 
will receive the greater total budget.  
If α  is large relative to the productivity spread [regime (b)], gaining greater autonomy 
becomes a strong incentive for I when seeking to select E’s allocation. In this case 
* ˆ
E I D D > , 
so that the I type prefers a degree of delegation in excess of what the principal would grant to 
the E-type. While continuing to delegate to I in excess of 
*
I D , the principal now reduces the 
degree of delegation to the E type below 
*
E D  in order to make this allocation less attractive. 
While the principal still delegates to the E type in excess of I type, she now assigns a greater 
total budget to the I type (as opposed to the E type). This case is illustrated in figure 2a, where 
the E type receives a budgetary assignment E and the I type an assignment E’. The dashed 
line  E EB B  gives the iso-budget curve corresponding to 
* *
E B , where obviously 
* * * *
I E B B < . 
With both E and E’ lying on the same indifference curve  I U ˆ , incentive compatibility is 
satisfied for the I type. Being more efficient under a greater degree of delegation, the E type 
strictly prefers the allocation at E despite the lower overall budget. As total budgets are 



























Figure 2a: Separation in regime (b).  Figure 2b: Non-existence of separation in regime (c).   17 
Finally, for a very high preference for autonomy only a pooling allocation is feasible, 
whereby both agents receive the same budget and the same degree of delegation [regime (c)]. 
Here, the agent’s preference for autonomy is so strong that the principal would effectively 
have to delegate more to the I type than to the E type. Figure 2b illustrates that this is 
impossible. Suppose E and E’ are assigned to the E and I type, respectively, such that 
* * * *
I E D D < . While the I type is indifferent, this allocation clearly violates the E type’s 
incentive constraint (ICE). While a reduction in the overall budget to the level at E’’ would 
restore incentive compatibility for the E type, it is now violated for the I type. The best the 
principal can then attain is an allocation in which both budgets and the degree of delegation 
are pooled.  
This is reflected in the fact that an allocation with  0
* * * * < − = ∆ I E D D D , as is required for 
α α ˆ >  in regime (c), violates the monotonicity condition (see Lemma 1). The underlying 
reason is a direct conflict between the incentive compatibility constraints (ICI) and (ICE) that 
cannot be resolved in the absence of transfers. Guesnerie and Laffont (1984) call an 
environment in which separation becomes unfeasible ‘non-responsive’. In their set-up and, 
similarly, in Laffont and Martimort (2002: section 2.10.2) non-responsiveness results from a 
conflict between the allocation that maximises total surplus and the monotonicity condition. 
In our case, this is different. It is easily checked that the maximisation of total surplus 
()() [ ] ( ) ()() [ ] I I I E E E B U H B U H φ β β λ φ β β λ − ⋅ + ⋅ − + − ⋅ + ⋅ , ˆ , ˆ 1 , ˆ , ˆ  implies  0 > ∆D  and is, 
therefore, compatible with monotonicity. In our case, non-responsiveness occurs due to a 
conflict between rent extraction (from the I type), requiring  0 < ∆D  and the monotonicity 
condition. Separation with  0 > ∆D  would increase the efficiency loss due to the rental 
payment in form of an excess budget  0
* * * > − I I B B  by more than it would increase the value 
of production.
17  
We conclude this section by providing the condition under which the principal abstains from 
financial transfers.  
                                                        
17 Morand and Thomas (2003) provide, within a different set-up, conditions for such a clash between rent 
extraction and monotonicity.   18 
Lemma 5. (i)  0
* * = E t  for all () α , a . (ii) There exists a function  () ( ) ∞ ∈ , 0 α a  such that 
() α a a tI ≤ ⇔ = 0
* * .
18 
Proof: See Appendix. 
Recall that the principal cannot extract the full job-satisfaction of agents due to wealth 
constraints. As in our case the inefficient agents seeks to mimic the efficient one, it is then 
optimal to always set the transfer  0
* * = E t . However, one would expect that a transfer paid to 
the inefficient type would help to relax the (ICI) constraint. While this is generally true, the 
use of a transfer becomes too costly when the agent has a weak preference for the transfer 
relative to his job-satisfaction, i.e. if a is sufficiently low. In this case, a substantial transfer 
would be required to motivate truth-telling on the part of the I type. Note that the expected 
cost of the transfer (in real resource terms), 
()
a
λ − 1 , becomes large when the agent’s preference 
a is low. The principal then abstains from transfers, whenever 
()
a
λ − 1  exceeds at  0 = I t  the 
marginal efficiency loss from the distorted budget allocation.
19 
5  Extensions of the model  
We now turn to an overview of the allocation when the agent’s job-satisfaction is sufficiently 
low for the principal to motivate him by use of financial transfers. In section 5.1 we consider a 
situation where output is still non-contractible. Nonetheless the principal can facilitate the 
separation of agents by linking the transfers to the budgetary allocation. In section 5.2 we 
allow output (but not effort) to be contractible. 
5.1  Use of financial transfers when output is non-contractible:  
In this section we extend our analysis and consider the full parameter space () α , a . We can 
identify five regimes for the budgetary allocation corresponding to the areas I-V in figure 3. 
We do not provide here a formal derivation of the various boundaries which is tedious 
without providing further insights. The interested reader is referred to Kuhn (2004: Lemma 5).  
                                                        
18 While we have derived this finding for linear preferences in money, the result easily extends to more general 
utility functions  () t z . Here, pooling is sustained if the marginal utility from money  () t z'  is sufficiently low 
when evaluated at the wealth constraint  0 t t =  (in our case normalised to zero). 
19 It can be shown that the  () α a  schedule has a negative slope for  0 ≥ α . This implies that financial transfers are 
the less likely to be used the lower the agents’ preference for autonomy. This is because the inefficiency in the 
budget allocation falls as α  decreases towards zero, where the agent’s and principal’s preferences with regard to 
autonomy converge.   19 
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Figure 3: Budgetary regimes in () α , a  space. 
We have discussed already areas I and V, corresponding to the separating and pooling 
allocation in the absence of transfers. Recall that the neglect of financial stimuli is not down 
to an ad-hoc assumption but rather the outcome of an optimisation on the part of the principal, 
where transfers are too costly for  () α a a < . 
In area II, the principal employs the transfer  0
* * > I t . Here, the cost of a monetary transfer to 
the I type is sufficiently low as to render efficient its use as an additional screening 
instrument. This allows a reduction in the screening-induced inefficiencies in budgeting. 
Specifically, for a higher a the principal reduces the size of the budgetary distortions 
* * *
i i B B − ,  I E i , = , implying a reduction in the excess budget for the I type and a mitigation 
in capital rationing of efficient types. A greater a also allows reducing the distortions in the 
degree of autonomy 
* * *
i i D D − . Nonetheless, for finite values of a, the degree of delegation 
designated to the two types converges as the boundary between areas II and III is approached. 
On the boundary itself, the degree of delegation is pooled but not the total budget. Here, the E 
type receives a greater budget, 
* * * *
I E B B > , while incentive compatibility for the I type is 
maintained by the transfer  0
* * > I t . Intuitively, as the preference for autonomy grows relative 
to the preference for financial transfers, it becomes increasingly costly both in terms of 
budgetary distortions and in terms of the financial transfer for the principal to uphold a large 
gap in the degree of delegation/autonomy.   20 
In areas III and IV, we have 
* * * *
I E B B >  and  0
* * > I t  and 
* * * *
I E D D < , implying a reversal of the 
degree of delegation. The E type receives the greater budget, 
* * * *
I E B B >  which in area III is 
sufficient to guarantee a slack incentive constraint for the E type. Nonetheless, the budgetary 
allocation is perverse in that the principal assigns the greater degree of delegation to the I type 
despite its lower productivity in the use of the delegated budget.
20 This distortion increases as 
the preference for monetary rewards a falls. A lower effectiveness of monetary transfers in 
inducing self-selection on the part of the I type also implies that the principal has to close the 
gap 0
* * * * > − I E B B . As the E type’s allocation is thus rendered less and less attractive, this 
leads to a situation in area IV where the incentive constraints bind for both types. Here, a 
further reduction in a will now also lead to a gradual shrinking in the gap  0
* * * * > − E I D D  
from a maximum at the boundary between areas III and IV until pooling both in budgets and 
in the degree of delegation is established on the boundary  () α a  between areas IV and V.  
The feasibility of separation within regime IV (and similarly in regime III) can be understood 
as follows. Both incentive constraints (ICE) and (ICI) continue to bind within regime IV, as 
they did within the pooling regime V. In contrast to regime V, however, the efficient use of 
financial transfers allows the principal to reconcile the conflicting self-selection constraints. 
This is illustrated in figure 2b. Consider the budget allocations E to the E type and I to the I 
type, where  0 < − = ∆ I E D D D  and  0 > − = ∆ I E B B B . While allocation E is preferred by 
both types, the principal sets the transfer  0 > I t  such that (ICI) is just binding. (ICE) is then 
satisfied if the monotonicity condition (M) holds. Satisfaction of (ICI) requires 
()
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α ρ β . Since 
0 > I at  allocations involving  0 < ∆D  are now feasible. Here, the spread in budgets  0 > ∆B  
can be made sufficiently large to induce the E type to self-select even a contract involving a 
lower degree of delegation and a lower financial transfer. By contrast, we see that pooling is 
not a pathological outcome but supported by a range of pairs () a , α  in region V. Although the 
principal could break a pooling equilibrium by use of financial transfers, she refrains from this 
when agents are disinterested in financial rewards relative to the working conditions (here: the 
                                                        
20 This notwithstanding the efficient type still receives the greater delegated budget, i.e. 
* * * *
I E b b > .   21 
degree of autonomy) and inducement of self-selection would require inefficiently high 
payments. 
5.2  Allocation when output is contractible  
In this section we consider the case, where the principal is able to link the agent’s 
compensation to output and not merely to the budget allocation. Here, the principal pays a 
transfer 0 > i t  if and only if the agent produces a pre-specified output level  i h ,  I E i , = . Note 
that under the wealth constraint the principal cannot fine the agent for deviations from the 
target. As there is no uncertainty involved in production we are dealing with a case of ‘false 
moral hazard’ (e.g. Laffont and Martimort 2002: section 7.1.4). Given the budget allocation 
{} i i r b , , a production target  i h  implies an effort  i e . We can then write the moral hazard 
constraint for type i as 
( ) () i i i i i i i i i r b e u r b e u at β β , , , , , ,
* − ≥ ,  I E i , =  (MHi), 
where  ( ) i i i i r b e u β , , ,
*  is the agent’s utility when foregoing the transfer and supplying effort 
() ( ) i i i i i i i i r b e u r b e e β β , , , max arg , , ˆ
* = = . In the following, we provide a brief overview of the 
results under full information and asymmetric information, respectively. A more detailed 
exposition of the analysis as well as formal proofs can be found in Kuhn (2004).  
Allocation in the absence of adverse selection 
When output is contractible, the principal can use financial rewards to stimulate effort beyond 
the level that would be volunteered even by a motivated agent.
21 The extent to which this is 
possible is governed by the agent’s responsiveness to financial rewards. As before, there is 
over-delegation if and only if the agent has a preference for autonomy, i.e. if and only if 
0 > α , the efficient agent receiving a greater degree of delegation. However, while in the 
absence of transfers, budgets were distorted with a view to increase the agent’s marginal 
benefit from providing effort, in the case of contractible output, the principal can stimulate 
effort more directly by setting an appropriate target  i h . The distortion in the budgets away 
from their first-best levels now helps the principal to contain the payment required to 
                                                        
21 This relies on the implicit assumption that financial incentives do not replace the agent’s non-financial 
motivation. In reality, crowding out of intrinsic motivation may matter (Frey 1993, 1997; Bénabou and Tirole 
2003, Grepperud and Pedersen 2004). This complication would not alter our main results.   22 
implement a given effort  i e . The financial rewards are thus leveraged and greater levels of 
effort can be stimulated. Finally, the availability of performance pay allows the principal to 
reduce the distortion in the degree of delegation away from the technological optimum. 
Allocation in the presence of adverse selection  
Here, the principal can design an output related reward scheme, but she is unable to observe 
the agent’s type. To explore the optimal contract under adverse selection we introduce some 
additional notation. Let  () ( ) i j j i i j j ij r b e u r b e e β β , , , max arg , , ˆ :
* = = ,  {} I E j i , , ∈  denote the 
effort that maximises type i’s utility when facing type  j ’s allocation, and let 
()








, , := ,  {} I E j i , , ∈  denote the effort type i needs to expend in order to meet type 
j ’s performance target  () j j j jj j r b f e h β , , = . In this case, the self-selection constraints 
() () ( ) {} I E E IE E I E E IE I I I I II r b e u at r b e u at r b e u β β β , , , , , , , max , , ,
* + ≥ +  (ICI’), 
() () ( ) {} E I I EI I E I I EI E E E E EE r b e u at r b e u at r b e u β β β , , , , , , , max , , ,
* + ≥ + , (ICE’), 
need to be taken into account besides the moral hazard constraints, (MHI) and (MHE). 
However, we can ignore the wealth constraints as these are implied by (MHI) and (MHE). 
Note from (ICI’) and (ICE’) that adverse selection can arise in two forms. Each type may 
have an incentive to mimic the other type either with a view to obtaining the possibly more 
attractive performance pay [the first argument in bracelets on the RHS of (ICI’) and (ICE’), 
respectively], or with a view to maximising job-satisfaction on the other type’s budget 
allocation (the second argument). As is common for models of mixed adverse selection and 
moral hazard, there is no clear-cut rule to determine the binding constraints. We can 
distinguish two cases. 
Case 1: Neither type has an incentive to mimic the other in order to attain the performance 
reward, implying that the LHS in (ICI’) and (ICE’) exceeds the first element in bracelets on 
the RHS. This requires that the effort level assigned to the I type be sufficiently low. 
Otherwise, the E type would have an incentive to mimic the I type and capture the 
performance payment at a low effort. The I type’s performance target is sufficiently low (i.e. 
sufficiently close to the level in the absence of rewards) if (and only if) the preference for 
financial rewards, a, is not too large. When a misrepresentation of type is not motivated by a 
desire to attain a more preferred payment, performance targets (conditional on the budget   23 
allocation) remain undistorted. The budget allocation is then analogous to the one realised in 
the case of non-contractible output (see figure 3 and Proposition 3).  
Case 2: Here, the preference for financial rewards is sufficiently high so that the E type has 
an incentive to mimic the I type. As long as the spread in productivity  I E β β −  is sufficiently 
large, the I type does not aspire to attain the E type’s performance reward. The following 
adverse selection incentives then arise for the two types. While the E type seeks to obtain the 
more attractive performance contract offered to the I type [the first element in bracelets in 
(ICE’) binds], the I type seeks to obtain the more attractive budget allocation designated to the 
E type without aiming to attain the performance target [the second element in bracelets in 
(ICI’) binds]. The principal responds to the compounded incentive problem as follows. 
Similar to the standard model with adverse selection (e.g. Laffont and Martimort 2002: 
section 7.4.1), the principal seeks to reduce the E type’s rent by lowering the I type’s target 
(and effort) as well as the degree of delegation assigned to this type. Meanwhile, the E type’s 
allocation remains distorted as described for case 1 with a view to reducing the I type’s rent.  
6  Conclusions  
We have studied a principal agent model of budget delegation to illuminate some of the 
implications of agents’ preferences for autonomy. The principal faces both a moral hazard and 
adverse selection problem to which she can react by adjusting the budget, the degree to which 
it is delegated as well as a payment to the agent. Under full information about the agent’s 
productivity the principal adjusts the budget and its delegation in order to stimulate additional 
effort or – in case of performance pay – in order to reduce the payment. Our key results relate 
to the case in which the principal is uninformed about productivity under delegation. 
Contracts turn out to be sensitive to the agent’s preference for autonomy and to the trade-off 
between job satisfaction and financial transfers. Generally, if agents strongly prefer job 
satisfaction to financial transfers, the latter will not be used in order to facilitate self-selection. 
A separating allocation can then be attained only if preferences for autonomy are not too 
strong. The distortion in the degree of delegation depends on the agents’ preference for 
autonomy. If agents are indifferent to autonomy, a separating allocation requires over-
delegation to the efficient type and no distortion for the inefficient type. For an increasing 
preference for autonomy the gap in the degree of delegation is gradually closed, and pooling 
arises when the preference for autonomy is sufficiently strong. This form of non-
responsiveness arises when the agent’s and the principal’s preferences regarding the   24 
allocation of autonomy are sufficiently divergent. Separation remains feasible when the 
agent’s preference for financial transfers is sufficiently strong. In this case, strong preferences 
for autonomy lead to a reversal in the degree of delegation. These results highlight the 
important implications of divergent preferences with regard to the mode of production.  
From an empirical perspective one would expect that budget allocations will be less sensitive 
to differences in the productivity of a delegated budget within those organisations or 
organisational units that rely on agents with a strong preference for autonomy. Indeed, 
pooling is the likely outcome if strong preferences for autonomy are coupled with weak 
interest in financial rewards relative to job-satisfaction. Cursory evidence suggests that this 
ties-in rather well with the prevalence of weaker performance incentives within public or non-
profit organisations relying on intrinsically motivated agents (Roomkin and Weisbrod 1999, 
Francois 2000, Dixit 2002, Besley and Ghatak 2003). A tendency towards pooled budgets 
within such organisations may be viewed critically in that it implies a misallocation of funds 
both to productive and unproductive agents. However, it should be borne in mind that pooling 
is an optimal response to the agents’ strong focus on job-satisfaction, which could only be 
swung by excessive financial transfers. Furthermore, the productivity gains from intrinsically 
motivated agents may well over-compensate the lack of efficiency in the budget allocation. 
While we derive the main results for the case in which output (and effort) are non-
contractible, we show that their substance carries over to the case of contractible output.  
In Kuhn (2004), we show in addition that similar results obtain when agents differ with regard 
to the preference for autonomy. A number of limitations and possible extensions deserve 
discussion. First, we assume that the agent’s input, effort, and the principal’s input, the 
budget, are complements in production. This implies that the principal, acting as first-mover, 
can stimulate additional effort by increasing the budget. More generally, budget and effort 
may also be substitutes, in case of which the principal would reduce her input.
22 However, as 
long as the efficient type receives the greater budget and greater degree of delegation, this 
would not substantively alter our analysis of budgeting under asymmetric information. 
Second, we assume that the principal uses the budgets as a screening device when 
productivity is the agent’s private information. Alternatively, one could follow Bénabou and 
Tirole (2003) and assume that the principal is informed about the productivity of the project 
and thus its value to the agent. In this case, the principal could signal to the agent a 
productive/attractive project by over-budgeting and over-delegating to an extent that would 
                                                        
22 See Glazer (2004) for an analysis of both cases.   25 
not be profitable for the non-productive project. However, separation may not be possible if a 
high preference for autonomy on the part of the agent and the ensuing effort incentives make 
it profitable to over-delegate to all types. Third, we have disregarded the effects of 
uncertainty. One way of introducing risk into the present framework is to model output as a 
random variable, where the agent’s type β  corresponds to the probability of making effective 
use of the delegated budget. As risk is attached to the use of a delegated budget more than to 
the use of a contolled budget the principal has an incentive to under-delegate relative to the 
first-best in order to reduce the agent’s risk premium. The presence of risk-aversion may have 
a positive bearing on the feasibility of separation. As the inefficient agent faces a greater 
probability of failure under delegation, aversion to this risk reduces the incentive to aspire for 
the efficient agent’s allocation. Thus, for high levels of α , risk contributes to reducing the 
distortion in the separating allocation. If agents are very risk averse, the presence of risk may 
even reverse the incentive problem. 
7  Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 1: Using (4) in (2) we obtain the first-order conditions 
() 0 , , ˆ = −φ βi i i b r b h  (A1a)  () I E i r b h i i i r , ; 0 , , ˆ = = −φ β  (A1b).
23 
Part (i): follows from comparative static analysis of the system (A1a) and (A1b) under use of 
(4). Parts (ii) and (iii): Using (A1a) and (A1b) together with the appropriate derivatives from 


































β . Obviously then,  0








β  implying the statements in part (ii) and (iii). 
Proof of Lemma 1: Given  0











, ˆ . 
Inserting this into the monotonicity condition (M) yields the equivalent condition 
()
() () () 0 , ˆ , ˆ
, ˆ
, ˆ
≥ ∆  

 
 ⋅ + ⋅
⋅
⋅ − D U U I D I B U
U
I B
I D β β β β β
β . Inserting the appropriate derivatives from (5) one can 
rewrite the condition to  () [] () 0 0
2
, ˆ 4 ≥ ∆ ⇔ ≥ ∆




U α ρ β . 
In the following, we will make repeated use of the following Lemma.  
                                                        
23 The second-order condition holds if and only if  () () () [] I E i h h h i br i rr i bb , ; 0 , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
2
= > ⋅ − ⋅ ⋅ β β β . Using (4) and 
observing  () 1 2 < + ρ βE  and  I E β β > , it is readily checked that this is satisfied.   26 
Lemma A1. Let  1 µ  and  2 µ  denote the multipliers associated with the (ICI) and (ICE) 
constraint, respectively, and let  3 µ  and  4 µ  denote the multipliers associated with the wealth 
constraints  0 ≥ I t  and  0 ≥ E t , respectively. The optimal allocation entails (i)  0 2 1 ≥ > µ µ ; 
(ii)  0 4 > µ ; (iii)  0 2 = µ  if  I E D D >  or if  I E D D =  and  I E B B ≠ ; and (iv)  0 3 = µ  if 
I E D D <  or if  I E D D =  and  I E B B ≠ . 
Proof: In terms of () i i r b ,  the problem is  π
I E i t r b i i i , ; , ,max
= , as given in (2), subject to the self-
selection constraints 
( )() E I E E I I I I at r b u at r b u + ≥ + β β , , ˆ , , ˆ    (ICI), 
()( ) I E I I E E E E at r b u at r b u + ≥ + β β , , ˆ , , ˆ , (ICE), 
and the wealth constraints  0 ≥ I t  and  0 ≥ E t , respectively. Using the designated shadow 
prices, we can write the first-order conditions for  I t ,  E t ,  I b ,  I r ,  E b  and  E r  as follows. 
() ( ) 0 1 3 2 1 = + − + − − µ µ µ λ a  (A2a), 
()0 4 2 1 = + − − − µ µ µ λ a  (A2b), 
() ( ) [ ] () () 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 2 1 = − + − − E I I x I I I x I I I x r b u r b u r b h β µ β µ φ β λ ;  r b x , =  (A2c/d), 
() [ ] () () 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ
2 1 = + − − E E E x I E E x E E E x r b u r b u r b h β µ β µ φ β λ ;  r b x , =  (A2e/f).
24 
Using { }
* * * * * * * * * * * * , , , , , I I I E E E t r b t r b  to denote the optimal allocation, we can now prove the 
parts of the Lemma as follows. 
Part (i): We prove  2 1 µ µ >  by contradiction. Thus, suppose  1 2 µ µ ≥ . From (A2a) this implies 
0 3 > µ  and, therefore,  0 = I t . (ICE) and (ICI) then imply  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) I E E I I I E E E E I I E r b u r b u r b u r b u at β β β β , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ 0
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * − ≤ − = ≤  (A3),   
                                                        
24 The second-order conditions are satisfied for  () 1 2 < + ρ βE  if the parameter k  in the function  () ⋅ u ˆ  [see RHS 
of (5)] is sufficiently low.   27 
where the first inequality follows from the wealth constraint and the second inequality is strict 
if and only if  0 1 > µ . Using (A2c) and (A2d), we obtain for  r b x , =  
() ( ) [ ] () () E I I x I I I x I I I x r b u r b u r b h β µ β µ φ β λ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 0 2 1 − + − − =  
() ( ) [ ] () () [] () ( ) [ ] φ β λ β β µ φ β λ − − < − + − − ≤ I I I x E I I x I I I x I I I x r b h r b u r b u r b h , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 1 ,  
implying 
* * *
I I b b <  and 
* * *
I I r r < . Similarly, one obtains from (A2e) and (A2f) 
* * *
E E b b >  and 
* * *
E E r r > . Together with  ( ) ( ) i I I i E E r b u r b u β β , , ˆ , , ˆ
* * * * >  this implies 
( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ
* * * * * * * * < − i E E i I I r b u r b u β β , which contradicts (A3).  
Part (ii):  0 4 > µ  follows from (A2b) under observation of  2 1 µ µ > .  
Part (iii): Assuming  I E D D >  we use figure 2a to show that this contradicts  0 2 > µ .
25 
Consider the allocations  {} E E D B E , =  and  {} I I D B I , = , obviously satisfying  I E D D > . 
Since  2 1 µ µ > , it follows from  0 2 > µ  that both (ICE) and (ICI) bind simultaneously. Noting 
0 0 4 = ⇔ > E t µ  and the constraint  0 ≥ I t  it must be true that 
() ( ) () () 0 , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ≥ − = − = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at β β β β . By construction, the allocations 
{} I E D B E , ' '=  and  {} I E D B E , ' ' ' ' =  satisfy  () ( ) I I E U E U β β , ' ˆ , ˆ =  and  () ( ) E E E U E U β β , ' ' ˆ , ˆ = . 
Consequently,  
() ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , ˆ , ' ' ˆ , ˆ , ' ˆ ≥ − = − = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at β β β β  (A4).   
For not too large differences in the budgets  0 ' ' > − I E B B  and  0 ' > − I E B B , the second equality 
in (A4) implies  () ( ) () ( ) I E I B I E E B B B U B B U − ⋅ = − ⋅ ' , ˆ ' ' , ˆ β β . Since  () () I B E B U U β β , ˆ , ˆ ⋅ > ⋅  this 
implies ' ' ' E E B B > , a contradiction. Hence,  0 2 > µ  is incompatible with  I E D D > .  
We go on to show that  0 2 > µ  contradicts  I E D D =  and  I E B B ≠ . To see this, consider the 
allocations E and  {} E I D B I , ' '=  in figure 2a. Here,  0 2 > µ  implies 
() () () () 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ , ' ˆ , ˆ ≥ − = − = E E I I I I U E U I U E U at β β β β . For small differences in budgets 
                                                        




















β ˆ ˆ , implying 
that for every pair () b r, t h e  I  t y p e ’s indifference curves are steeper sloped than the E type’s.    28 
0 '> − I E B B , this implies  ( ) () ( ) () ' , ˆ ' , ˆ
I E I B I E E B B B U B B U − ⋅ = − ⋅ β β . For  () () I B E B U U β β , ˆ , ˆ ⋅ > ⋅  
this is satisfied if and only if  ' I E B B = , a contradiction. 
Part (iv): Assume by contradiction that  0 3 > µ  and  I E D D <  are simultaneously true. Noting 
that 0 3 > µ  implies  0 = I t , it follows that (ICI) requires  () ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = − I E E I I I D B U D B U β β . 
This would, indeed, be satisfied by the allocations  {} E E D B E , =  and  {} I I D B E , '=  in figure 
2b. However, it is immediately established that 
() ( ) () ( ) 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ 0 , ' ˆ , ˆ < − ⇒ = − E E I I E U E U E U E U β β β β  implying that (ICE) is violated. Hence, 
0 3 > µ  and  I E D D <  cannot hold at the same time. Consider now  I E D D = . Since  0 3 > µ  
implies 0 = = E I t t , it follows from (ICI) and (ICE) that  I E B B = . Hence,  I E D D =  and 
I E B B ≠  imply  0 3 = µ . 
Proof of Lemma 2: Equating the LHS of (A2c) and (A2d), and rearranging gives 
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()
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   (A5) 
where the second equality follows under observation of 
() () () . , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ
1 1
2 1




− − − = −  as from (A2d). Inserting the relevant 
derivatives from (4) and (5) into (A5) and rearranging yields 






















+ − + − + = =
E I I I I
I
I
E I I r I I I r r
b









.   29 
From Lemma 1, we note that 
* * * *
I E D D ≥  must be true. Part (iii) of Lemma A1, then implies 
that  0 2 = µ  if 
* * * *
I E D D > . From part (i) of the same Lemma we know that  0 1 > µ . 
Observing that  () () () i j i i B i
j






= , , ˆ 1 , , ˆ ,  I E j i , , = , and employing 
the definitions in (6) and (7) then allows us to establish (8a). Starting from (A2e) and (A2f), it 
is straightforward to derive (8b) in a similar fashion. 
Proof of Lemma 3: Part (i): Since  I I D D ˆ 0
* ≤ ⇔ ≥ α , it follows from (8a) that 
* * *
I I D D ≤ for 0 2 = µ . From (6), (7) and (9a), we obtain that 
* ˆ
E I D D < ⇔ <α α . For 
0 2 = µ , it then follows from (8b) that 
* * *
E E D D < . Hence, 
[[
* * * * * * , 0 E E I I D D D D < < ≤ ⇔ ∈ α α , where the inequalities imply  0 2 = µ  from part (iii) 
Lemma A1. 
Parts (ii) and (iii):   Since  I E D D ˆ * ≤ ⇔ ≥α α , it follows from (8b) that 
* * *
E E D D ≤  for 
0 2 = µ . With 
* * *
I I D D < , we have to prove that 
* * * * ˆ I E D D > ⇔ <α α . Using (8a) and (8b) 
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or after employing (A2d) and (A2f) and rearranging 
() ()
() [ ]( ) 0 ˆ ˆ
1
, , ˆ , , ˆ
2
* * * * ≥ − + + ⇔ ≥ − I E
r b u r b u
I E D D Z D D




β µ    (A6) 
() ( ) () ( ) I I I I I r I E E E E r D D r b h D D r b h Z ˆ , , ˆ ˆ , , ˆ * * − − − = β β . 
Inserting the appropriate derivatives from (4) and rearranging terms we can rewrite  
() ( ) ( ) []
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1 2 2 1 2 2
1 2 2 1 2 2
. 
Assume for the moment  0 2 = µ  and consider a pooling allocation {} P I E P I E r r r b b b = = = = ; 
that satisfies    30 
{}
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= − = = = =
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P I E P I E b b
b b
Z . 
It is readily verified that this implies 
()
() ( ) α α β β
β
β ρ β β ρ













P , where  P
P P
D
D B P b P
+ = =
1 :.  
Note that  () ρ α α , ˆ ∈ . From comparative static analysis of the system 
() ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = − I E E I I I r b u r b u β β , (A2a) and (A2c)-(A2f) each with  0 2 = µ  we obtain after 
tedious calculations ( ) 0
0 ; ; 2
** **
< −
= = = = = µ α α P I E P I E
I E
B B B D D D d
dD
d
dD . Note that for  0 = = I E t t , (ICI) and 
(ICE) imply  I E I E B B D D = ⇔ = . Hence,  0 0 ; 0 ; 0 2 < = = = = µ α Z t t d
dZ
I E . But then, 




























= = I E t t Z    (A7). 
Recall from Lemma A1, part (ii) that  0 2
* * * * = ⇒ > µ I E D D . Hence, from (A6) 
0 0 2 = ⇒ > µ Z . Considering  0 = Z , we can prove by contradiction that this implies  0 2 = µ . 
Suppose  0 = Z  and  0 2 > µ  hold at the same time. In this case, it follows from (A6) that 
* * * *
I E D D > , contradicting  0 2 > µ . Hence,  0 0 2 = ⇒ ≥ µ Z  must be true.  
From (A6) and (A7) it follows 
* * * * ˆ I E D D ≥ ⇔ ≤α α , with a strict inequality on the RHS 
implying and being implied by one on the LHS. Finally, consider  α α ˆ > . From (A7), this 
implies  0 0 < = = I E t t Z . For  0 = = I E t t , (ICI) and (ICE) imply 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ , , ˆ
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * = − = − I E E I I I E E E E I I r b u r b u r b u r b u β β β β . However, it is readily 
checked from figure 2b that for the utility specification in (5), this is only satisfied for a 
pooling allocation, i.e. for { } P I E P I E r r r b b b = = = =
* * * * * * * * ; . Hence, 
* * * * ˆ I E D D = ⇒ >α α . 
Corollary.  α α µ ˆ 0 0 2 > ⇔ > = = I E t t . 
Proof: We have obtained  0 ˆ 0 2 = ⇒ ≤ = = I E t t µ α α  as part of the proof of Lemma 3. As 
0 0 < = = I E t t Z  and 
* * * *
I E D D =  both hold for  α α ˆ > , it follows from (A6) that 
0 ˆ 0 2 > ⇒ > = = I E t t µ α α . In combination this implies the corollary.   31 
Proof of Lemma 4: From the first-order conditions (A2e) and (A2f), respectively, it follows 
for  0 2 = µ  that  () () 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 > = + =
E
b I E E b E E E b r b u r b h ς β φ β λ
µ  and 
() () 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ 1 > = + =
E
r I E E r E E E r r b u r b h ς β φ β λ
µ . As  () 0 , ˆ > ⋅ I b u β ,  () 0 , ˆ > ⋅ I r u β  and  0 1 ≥ µ , we 
have  1 ≥
E
b ς  and  1 ≥
E
r ς . It follows from the second-order condition 
() () () [] 0 , ˆ , ˆ , ˆ
2








b E r ς ς , ˆ  are 
decreasing functions in 
E
b ς  and 
E
r ς . But then  () ()





b E E b b b b = ≤ = ς ς  and 
() ()




b E E r r r r = ≤ = ς ς  is always true. By a similar proof, it can be shown that 
* * *
I I b b ≥  and 
* * *
I I r r ≥ . Together this implies 
* * *
I I B B ≥  and 
* * *
E E B B ≤ . This proves the 
relevant inequalities in parts (i)-(iii). 
Note that the budget lines in () b r,  space (see figure 2a) have the slope –1. As indifference 
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I D ˆ , the condition can be equally 
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β β  or equivalently 
I E D D ˆ ≤  are sufficient for  E I B B > .  
We then have 
* * * * * * * ˆ ˆ 0 E I I I I I B B D D D D < ⇒ ≥ ⇔ ≥ ⇔ = α , which, evoking continuity, 
proves part (i). Similarly,  [[
* * * * * * * ˆ ˆ ˆ , I E I E I E B B D D D D < ⇒ ≤ ⇔ ≤ ⇔ ∈ α α α , which proves 
part (ii). Finally, for  α α ˆ ≥  a pooling allocation obtains where 
P I E P I E B B B D D D = = ⇔ = =
* * * * * * * * , which proves part (iii). 
Proof of Lemma 5: Part (i) follows immediately from Lemma A1, part (ii).  
Part (ii): In what follows we write the equilibrium degree of delegation 
() I E i a d D
i
i , , ,
* * = = α  and the shadow prices  () a , ˆ 1 α µ µ =  and  () a , ˆ ˆ 2 α µ µ =  as functions of 
the parameters α  and a. From (A2a), we obtain  ( ) ()() [ ] { } 0 , , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 max 3 a a a α µ α µ λ µ − − − = . 
Using this, we can now show that there exists a function  () ( ) ∞ ∈ , 0 α a  such that 
() α µ a a ≤ ⇔ > 0 3 . 
Consider a situation with  0 3 > µ , or equivalently with  0 = = I E t t , where  0 = E t  follows 
from Lemma A1, part (ii). From the corollary to Lemma 3, we know that   32 
α α µ ˆ 0 0 2 > ⇔ > = = I E t t . Thus, we distinguish two cases. First, consider  α α ˆ ≤ , where 
() 0 , ˆ ˆ 2 = = a α µ µ  and therefore  ()( ) {} 0 , , ˆ 1 max 3 a a α µ λ µ − − = . For  0 3 > µ  comparative static 
analysis of the system  () ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = − I E E I I I r b u r b u β β , (A2a) and (A2c)-(A2f) with  0 2 = µ  
yields  () 0 , ˆ = a a α µ . Hence, 
()() [] () 0 , ˆ 0
, ˆ 1
3 < − = >
− − a da
a a d α µ µ
α µ λ . Since  0 ˆ 0 3 = ⇒ > a µ µ , it 
follows that  ()()( ) α µ α µ α µ µ ˆ 0 , ˆ , ˆ 0 3 = = ⇒ > a . Furthermore,  () ( ) ∞ ∈ , 0 ˆ α µ  is positive and 
finite. But then  ()( ) [] () 0 1 ˆ 1 lim
0 > − = − −
→ λ α µ λ a
a  and  ()( ) [] −∞ = − −
∞ → α µ λ ˆ 1 lim a
a . Hence, there 
exists a  () ( ) ∞ ∈
− , 0 α a  such that  ()( ) () α α µ λ µ
− ≤ ⇔ > − − = a a a 0 ˆ 1 3 . 
Now consider  α α ˆ > , where  () 0 , ˆ ˆ 2 > = a α µ µ  and, therefore, 
( ) ()() [ ] { } 0 , , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 max 3 a a a α µ α µ λ µ − − − = . Comparative static analysis for the full pooling 
system  () ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = − I E E I I I r b u r b u β β ,  () ( ) 0 , , ˆ , , ˆ = − E I I E E E r b u r b u β β , (A2a) and (A2c)-(A2f) 
with 0 2 > µ  yields  () () 0 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ = = a a a a α µ α µ . Hence, 
() () () [ ] [ ] ()() [ ] 0 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 0
, ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1
2 3 < − − = > >
− − − a a da
a a a d α µ α µ µ µ
α µ α µ λ . Since  0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 3 = = ⇒ > a a µ µ µ , we have 
()()( )( )( )( ) α µ α µ α µ α µ α µ α µ µ ˆ ˆ ˆ 0 , ˆ ˆ 0 , ˆ , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 0 3 − = − = − ⇒ > a a . Furthermore, 
() () ][ ∞ ∈ − , 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ α µ α µ . But then  () ( ) ( ) [ ] { } () 0 1 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 lim
0
> − = − − −
→
λ α µ α µ λ a
a  and 
() ( ) ( ) [ ] { } −∞ = − − −
∞ →
α µ α µ λ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 lim a
a . Hence, there exists a value  () ( ) ∞ ∈
+ , 0 α a  such that 
( ) () () [ ] () α α µ α µ λ µ
+ ≤ ⇒ > − − − = a a a 0 ˆ ˆ ˆ 1 3 .  
Finally,  ( ) ()() [ ] { } ()[] ()( ) {} a a a a a a a , ˆ 1 lim , ˆ ˆ 1 , ˆ ˆ , ˆ 1 lim
ˆ ˆ
α µ λ α µ λ α µ α µ λ
α α α α
− − = − − = − − −
− + → →
 
implies  () () α α ˆ ˆ
+ − = a a . The negative slope of  () α
− a  and  () α
+ a  can be established from the 
system (A2a)-(A2f) under use of the implicit function theorem. But then this implies a 
continuous (and decreasing) function  () α ˆ a  on the domain [ ) ρ , 0.  
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